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of-use#LAAAdd the fact that any human being, placed in any one of these
language communities at birth, will acquire full competence in
the local language, and the cultural model equates to two null
hypotheses: Every extant and past mapping between linguistic
form and meaning is learnable under the circumstances in
which humans typically encounter them, and we come into the
world equipped with the capacity to acquire, and eventually to
transmit, such mappings across generations by cultural learning.
The impression that language requires constraints on its forms
(such as its grammar) other than those imposed by the logic of
cultural transmission itself stems from a half-century old strategic
confound introduced into linguistics by Noam Chomsky (1959).
One argument Chomsky opposed to behaviorist claims regard-
ing language acquisition was a formal one: The sophisticated
Suppes-Estes formalization of behaviorist learning theory lacks
the power to acquire a grammar of human caliber (Chomsky
1975, in Piattelli-Palmarini 1980, p. 111). Although the logical
possibility remained that behaviorist learning theory is
inadequate as learning theory, Chomsky took the unlearnability
of human grammar by its means to support the proposition
that grammar is innate. Through his persistent efforts, the fact
that humans have a unique biological endowment for language
has come to be identiﬁed with a presumptive innate grammar
to which learning contributes but “minor modiﬁcations that
give one language or another, depending on experience”
(Chomsky, in Harnad 1976), as if this were the only way to
have an endowment for language.
There is neither need nor justiﬁcation for biologically oriented
work on human language to continue to accommodate this stra-
tegic confound. Cultural transmission delivers the restricted
search space needed to enable language learning, not by con-
straining the form language takes on an innate basis, but by
ensuring that the form in which language is presented to the
learner is learnable (Zuidema 2003). The target of the new gen-
eration’s learning process is itself the outcome of a learning
process (previous generation). Gold’s 1967 theorem – cited as
recently as 2002 by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (see Hauser
et al. 2002) – accordingly cannot decide between learned and
innate grammar (Zuidema 2003; see also Clark 2001; Horning
1969; Johnson 2004; Lappin & Shieber 2007). Moreover, across
generations of learning agents, cultural transmission has the
power to transform a state of arbitrary strings randomly paired
with meanings into a shared and efﬁcient grammar without inter-
vention of natural selection or differential reinforcement of out-
comes (Kirby 2002). This apparent magic results from
competition among strings for access to subsequent generations
via the “learner bottleneck,” a central aspect of the “poverty of
the stimulus” argument. In this competition more efﬁcient and
general forms tend to outlast others over generations.
What remains is to complete the cultural model with a way to
sustain the chain of transmission of initial nonsense (unsemanti-
cized, ungrammaticized strings) over the many generations
required for convergence on a shared grammar. The ideal prior
state for this can be found among the cultural traditions of
complex learned song of many songbirds and a few mammals.
Some of these are not conﬁned to cultural variations on an
innate pattern, the “species-speciﬁc song” recently invoked by
Fitch (2008), but are emancipated from innate constraint on the
form song takes (calls and songs of 76 species of birds from two
continents have been identiﬁed in the repertoire of the marsh
warbler: Baylis 1982; Dowsett-Lemaire 1979). Under circum-
stances explored in Merker and Okanoya (2007), a prelinguistic
human adaptation for emancipated song would provide the mech-
anism to sustain string transmission for however long convergence
might take, because it would be driven by the need to impress by
elaborate vocal display rather than to communicate meaning.
But “Something about the faculty of language must be unique
in order to explain the differences between humans and other
animals” (Fitch et al. 2005, p. 182, emphasis in original).
Indeed, this is a condition met by the very adaptation needed
for song learning to be possible, as ﬁrst proposed by Darwin
(1871). It is a dedicated learning capacity missing in all other pri-
mates – our ape relatives included – but essential for every word
and sentence we know how to pronounce, namely the capacity to
learntoreproduce, by voice, patterns ofsound originally received
by ear, technically known as vocal production learning (Janik &
Slater 1997). We share this capacity with some of the singers
and all mimics among the birds, and with a few mammals, yet
we alone, of all species, have evolved vocal learning in the
setting of a primate brain.
Supported by a conformal motive (Merker 2005) and de novo
evolution of a direct projection from primary motor cortex to the
respiratory and phonatory motor nuclei of the lower brainstem
(Brown et al. 2008; Okanoya & Merker 2007), vocal learning
turns the cerebral territories centered on Wernicke’s and Broca’s
areas from their non-language uses in other primates to the
service of human language by recruiting them to the generative
production and intergenerational transmission of culturally
learned vocal lore. To it we owe not only our developmental trajec-
tory for language learning, infant babbling included, but our pro-
pensity for imitation and ritual culture more generally (Merker
2005), along with a robust selection pressure for encephalization
(Merker, in press; Merker & Okanoya 2007). As repeatedly urged
by students of birdsong (Doupe ´ & Kuhl 1999; Marler 1970; Notte-
bohm1975), this distinctive capacity of ours for vocal learning holds
the biological key to the singularity of human language. Through it,
and unconstrained by innate so-called universal grammar, the
historical ﬁlter of cultural transmission – which passes only the
possible – continually adapts the actual forms of languages to
multiple interacting constraints such as use, utility, learnability,
and neural resources (Christiansen & Chater 2008), as well as
cultural norms (Everett 2005), with diversity in train.
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Abstract: Understanding the universal aspects of human language
structure requires comparison at multiple levels of analysis. While
Evans & Levinson (E&L) focus mostly on substantive variation in
language, equally revealing insights can come from studying formal
universals. I ﬁrst discuss how Artiﬁcial Grammar Experiments can test
universal preferences for certain types of abstract phonological
generalizations over others. I then discuss moraic onsets in the
language Arrernte, and how its apparent substantive variation
ultimatelyrests ona formaluniversal regarding syllable-weight sensitivity.
The target article by Evans & Levinson (E&L), questioning not
only the existence of universals but the methodology of pursuing
them, raises many issues for discussion. In this commentary, I
limit my remarks to the importance of formal (as opposed to sub-
stantive) universals – a distinction E&L do not draw with sufﬁ-
cient clarity. Formal universals in phonology are constituted by
the analytic elements that human minds employ in constructing
representations of sound structure. Put simply, formal universals
refer to the set of available data structures (e.g., binary features,
metrical grids, autosegmental tiers) and the possible operations
on them that can be used in constructing a grammar of a language.
Phonotactic dependencies of the form Given segments A, B in
the same word, if A has feature F, then B must have feature G are
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These analytic restrictions are, by hypothesis, formal universals
that are independent of the historical contingencies or cultural
practices of any given language community. One of the best
ways of studying formal universals of this kind is by constructing
Artiﬁcial Grammar Learning experiments, using the method-
ology of cognitive science.
In one such recent study, Moreton (2008) conducted an exper-
iment in which participants were taught a miniature artiﬁcial
language containing phonotactic dependencies of the form out-
lined above. There were three conditions: in one, F and G
were both vowel height; in a second, F and G were both obstru-
ent voicing; and in a third, F was vowel height and G was obstru-
ent voicing. Importantly, the rules of English phonotactics do not
contain any of these three dependencies. The results, however,
showed that the height-voice dependency was not learned by
participants. Moreton’s conclusion was that an analytic bias
favors learning certain phonotactic dependencies over others;
the resulting formal phonological universal is in (1):
(1) Learning phonotactic dependencies of the form Given seg-
ments A, B in the same word, if A has feature F, then B must
have feature G is universally easier when F and G are the
same feature than when F and G are different features.
Formal universals like (1) lend themselves to eminently more
possibilities for integration with the cognitive sciences than
E&L’s proposed research program based on “the dual role of bio-
logical and cultural-historical attractors” (target article, sect. 8,
para. 6, E&L’s thesis 5). Formal universals allow for experimental
testing in laboratory conditions under which the historical-
cultural factors are completely controlled for, and hence
irrelevant to the outcomes.
It is worth considering how apparent exceptions to universals
are analyzed in other ﬁelds. As an example, consider the case
of the Jacana bird, one of nature’s species exhibiting a “sex-role
reversal,” whereby it is the females that engage in polyandry
and cuckolding of the males. At the right level of analysis, the
sex-role reversal in these shorebirds is entirely unsurprising,
because it is the males that perform the raising of the chicks.
The correct asymmetry between sexes is not that males have mul-
tiple mates while females do not, but rather, that the sex that
commits to what biologists call “parental investment” is the one
who is stuck in the harem. When the universal is correctly formu-
lated, the Jacana bird is actually an exception that proves the rule.
I argue that E&L err in concluding that there are no universals
within human phonology based on apparent substantive exceptions:
But in 1999, Breen and Pensalﬁni published a clear demonstration that
Arrernte organizes its syllables around a VC(C) structure and does not
permit consonantal onsets(Breen & Pensalﬁni 1999). With the addition
of this one language to our sample, the CV syllable gets downgraded
from absolute universal to a strong tendency, and the status of the
CV assumption in any model of UG must be revised. (target article,
sect. 2.2.2, para. 2)
Arrernte is not, as E&L would have it, but one language that
recently “ruined the entire sample,” so to speak. The question of
VC syllabiﬁcation in Australian languages was raised by Sommer
(1970; 1981) on the language Oykangand, later insightfully ana-
lyzed in terms of onset-maximization by McCarthy and Prince
(1986). There was, historically, a widespread loss of initial conso-
nants throughout Australian languages, which Hale (1964) and
Blevins (2001) attributed to stress shift and lenition processes.
Although Arrernte was apparently no exception to this sweeping
change, nonetheless, “25% of Arrernte words are pronounced in
isolation with an initial consonant” (Breen & Pensalﬁni 1999,
p. 2). To account for words such as mp
war and ta˛k, Breen and
Pensalﬁni (1999) have to propose that these words have an under-
lying hidden initial vowel, a red-ﬂag for any “clear demonstration”
that the language disallows consonantal onsets.
In general, the deduction of which syllabiﬁcation pattern a
word contains depends on particular phonological processes
that refer to syllabic divisions. In this light, consider the following
formal universal:
(2) Stress assignment, weight-sensitive allomorphy, compensa-
tory lengthening and prosodic morphology, when sensitive to
distinctions among syllable types, refer exclusively to the rep-
resentational unit of weight called the mora.
The phonological universal in (2), developed by Hyman (1985),
McCarthy and Prince(1986),andHayes (1989),isformal,not sub-
stantive in nature: it restricts the data structures that can be
referred to by morphophonological processes, and is not about
the substantive question of which segments can bear moras. In
fact, Topintzi (2009) has gathered evidence from a wide range of
languages demonstrating the ability of onset consonants to be
moraic. The existence of metrical processes referring to onsets
has been a topic of research for many years; see Davis (1988),
Downing (1998), Goedemans (1998), and Gordon (2005), who
discuss onset-sensitivity of stress in languages ranging from
English and Italian to Piraha ˜ and Iowa-Oto.
If vowels and onset consonants, but not coda consonants, are
moraic in Arrernte, the statement of stress assignment and
weight-sensitive allomorphy become quite straightforward in
the light of (2). In Arrernte, stress is assigned within a word to
the ﬁrst vowel preceded by a consonant: mp
wa ´.rem, “is
making,” versus i.k
we ´nt, “policeman.” Since onset consonants
are moraic, the stress rule is simple: the left-most bimoraic sylla-
ble receives stress. Similarly, the statement of plural allomorphy
in Arrernte is simple: bimoraic-or-greater forms like i.˛el and
ta˛k take the sufﬁx -ewar, while monomoraic forms like ar and
a˛k take the sufﬁx -erir. The reduplication patterns can receive
a similar treatment in terms of moraic targets, within the prosodic
morphology framework: for example, the copying of VC strings to
a reduplicant is driven by the demand to ﬁll a bimoraic template.
Like the Jacana bird’s sex-role reversal, which has a mechanis-
tic and principled explanation at a different level of primitives
(partner with greater parental investment, instead of male and
female), the patterning of weight-sensitive process in Arrernte
exhibits a principled conformity to a formal universal at the
level of which consonants are moraic, instead of in terms of syl-
labiﬁcation. Rather than positing a silent initial vowel for 25%
of Arrernte words, attention to the statement of formal universals
enables a consistent representational property for syllables
throughout the language. The universal in this case pertains to
the set of data structures that learners use to encode sound pat-
terns: moras, and only moras, are the formal unit that can be
referred to by weight-sensitive properties.
E&L trumpet the slogan “A linguist who asks ‘Why?’ must be a
historian” (sect. 7, epigram, quoting Haspelmath 1999, p. 205).
Integration with the cognitive sciences, however, will come
from mechanistic explanations, not from hand-waving at diachro-
nic contingencies. Formal universals are restrictions on represen-
tational vocabulary, and they rear their heads even when history
deals them an odd shufﬂe or, as in the case of artiﬁcial grammar
experiments, no historical shufﬂe at all.
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Abstract: In our opinion, the discontinuity between extant human and
nonhuman minds is much broader and deeper than most researchers
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